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Pursuant to subsection 38(1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, your family 
member, Jocelyn Colaco, is a person whose health condition: Mental Retardation - Mild, 
might reasonably be expected to cause excessive demand on health or social services… As 
a result, your family member is inadmissible to Canada on health grounds. (Colaco vs. 
Canada, Minister of Citizenship and Immigration 2006) 
The statement above was published in a Federal Court of Canada decision. It is an excerpt from a 
decision letter sent by Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC) to Savita and Peter Colaco, who 
applied to immigrate to Canada in the ‘skilled worker’ category in 2003 but were denied entry 
because a CIC medical officer judged that one of their two children, who has an intellectual 
disability would place an ‘excessive’ burden on the Canadian social service system.  This decision 
reflects statutory provisions contained within immigration law that mandate CIC staff to assess 
applicants to determine whether they have health conditions (including disabilities) ‘that might 
reasonably be expected to cause excessive demand on health or social services’ (Immigration of 
Refugee Protection Act, 2001). 
In this paper we examine the extent to which Canada’s immigration laws shape and 
constrain the mobility of immigrants with disabilities. We draw on key informant interviews, 
policy analysis and immigration data to critically assess the ‘excessive demand’ provisions of the 
immigration law, and the extent to which these constitute barriers to disabled persons attempting 
to immigrate to Canada. Our aims in the paper are twofold. First, we draw attention to the ways in 
which the immigration system, as a ‘space of exception’ (Ong 2006) beyond the protections 
afforded Canadian citizens, positions some disabled bodies as problematic. This positioning 
embodies longstanding biopolitical concerns with the well-being of the nation, but it also reflects 
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a more contemporary intensification of market logics in immigration policy (Ong 2006; Martin 
2011; Saltes 2013). Second, through our analysis, we wish to contribute to an ongoing cross-
fertilization between geographic research on disability and the burgeoning mobilities literature. 
Given that the barriers that confront disabled people in their efforts to move have been central to 
disability scholarship in recent decades, there is good reason to consider how the wave of interest 
in im/mobilities resonates with disability scholarship. At the same time, disability research can 
usefully inform understandings of the diversity, and contextually embedded nature, of human 
(im)mobility. There is already valuable scholarship on the ‘mundane’ or everyday im/mobilities 
of disabled people, especially in Western urban settings. However, there has been relatively little 
attention given to disabled people’s experiences of more exceptional forms of im/mobility, 
including immigration. 
In what follows, we examine recent geographic scholarship on disability, with attention to 
questions of movement and mobility. We then engage recent mobilities scholarship, focusing 
particularly on the ‘differential politics of mobility’ (Cresswell 2010a) that confront different 
groups at multiple spatial scales. Next, we outline the methods used in our research.  Our analysis 
comprises two sections. The first looks at the evolving nature of the medical inadmissibility 
provisions within Canadian immigration law. The second uses a legal challenge to these provisions 
as a window onto the logics and practices that position some disabled bodies as excessively 
burdensome. We conclude by reflecting on legal efforts to challenge this ‘space of exception’ 
while acknowledging that recent developments in immigration policy signal a heightening of 




Disability, accessibility, movement 
The past two decades have seen a burgeoning scholarship on the diverse social geographies of 
disabled people (Gleeson 1998; Butler and Parr 1999; Imrie and Edwards 2008; Chouinard et al 
2010; Blewett and Hanlon 2016; Hall and Wilton 2016). A central concern of this scholarship has 
been to understand the ways in which the organization of society –in terms of the built environment, 
cultural norms, structure of the economy, and state institutions – work to facilitate or constrain the 
participation of disabled people in different spheres of social life. Initially, the ‘social model of 
disability’ informed much of this work (Gleeson 1998; Shakespeare 2014). Developed within 
disability studies, this conceptual framework drew a distinction between people’s physical, mental, 
intellectual and sensory impairments and the disabling impacts of a society that failed to 
accommodate or make space for a diverse population with varying physical, mental and sensory 
needs and capacities (Gleeson 1998; Chouinard et al 2010). More recent work has recognized the 
limitations of the social model, embracing strands of relational thinking to approach disablement 
as a process that is shaped by ongoing and contingent social and spatial relationships (e.g., Thomas 
2004, Macpherson 2010, Worth 2013; Hall and Wilton 2016). From this perspective, 
understandings and experiences of disability can be understood as ‘emergent properties’ located 
in ‘the interplay between the biological reality of physiological impairment, structural conditioning, 
and socio-cultural interaction/elaboration’ (Williams 1999 in Shakespeare 2014, p.73). We adopt 
such a perspective here to examine how disability emerges through the interplay of statutory 
provisions of immigration law and practical enactments of the immigration system by applicants, 
visa officers, medical examiners, and others.  
Questions of movement and accessibility have been central to geographic scholarship on 
disability. To a significant extent, this research focus reflects and responds to the importance of 
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mobility and accessibility as key political issues within broader disability rights movements. In the 
United States, the direct action tactics of ADAPT were centrally focused on the need for accessible 
public transportation (Fleischer and Zames 2001). In the United Kingdom, DAN (the Direct Action 
Network) placed similar emphasis on the need to ensure access to transit systems, employing the 
motto ‘to go where all others have been before’ (Kitchin 1998). 
Geographic scholarship has drawn attention to both the changes that have come about as a 
result of disabled people’s activism as well as the continuing challenges that disabled people face 
with respect to accessibility and mobility (e.g., van Hoven and Elzinga 2009; Taylor and 
Jozefowicz 2012; Imrie 2012; Gaete-Reyes 2015). On the one hand, this scholarship has focused 
attention on the enduring practical difficulties of movement. Comparing intra-urban mobility of 
disabled and non-disabled people, Taylor and Jozefowicz (2012) find that disabled people make 
fewer and shorter trips.  The authors attribute these differences to several factors including material 
constraints and the inaccessibility of urban environments and transit systems. These findings 
resonate with other recent work on the problems and exclusions that disabled people continue to 
face in their efforts to be mobile in urban settings (van Hoven and Elzinga 2009; Imrie 2012; 
Gaete-Reyes 2015). On the other hand, studies have directed attention to the misrepresentations of 
disability that underlie and inform policy and decision-making about movement and accessibility. 
Imrie (2012, p.2266) examines ‘Shared Space’ urban design initiatives, arguing that in government 
documents and consultations ‘knowledge of/about diverse bodies in interaction with shared space 
is conspicuous by its absence’. Where disabled people are present, their experiences are often 
rendered in problematic and essentialist terms. Such ‘undifferentiated thinking’ produces spaces 
that are attuned to the mobility needs and capacities of a supposedly universal (but implicitly non-
disabled) human subject (van Hoven and Elzinga 2009, p.241). For Imrie, these misrepresentations 
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contribute to the ongoing marginalization of disabled people, and reflect enduring assumptions 
about the status of disability as ‘anathema to the… core values of mobility’ (p.2261). 
Existing geographic scholarship has made important contributions to an understanding of 
disabled people’s experience of in/accessibility and im/mobility. However, much of this work has 
been concerned with what Binnie et al. (2007) characterize as ‘mundane’ or everyday mobilities, 
particularly in contemporary urban built environments and transportation networks. By contrast, 
much less attention has been given to the experiences of disabled people with respect to more 
exceptional forms of movement such as those involved in international migration. As one 
exception, Maddern and Stewart (2010) have assessed the impact of biometric technologies at 
border crossings for bodies that fail to approximate non-disabled norms, while Ingram (2010) has 
looked at the ways in which national security concerns have shaped immigration policy towards 
people with HIV/AIDS. There has also been some important work in the tourism literature 
examining the practical challenges confronting disabled people as international travellers (e.g., 
Poria et al 2010; Darcy 2012). While this work is concerned with short-term travel for business or 
leisure, our aim here is to shed further light on the nature of disabled people’s experiences within 
the immigration system as they attempt to move permanently from one country to another. There 
is good reason to devote attention to this issue. As we noted above, recent decades have seen 
important advances with respect to disability rights legislation in countries such as Canada, the 
UK and the US. However, immigration systems often stand as ‘spaces of exception’ (cf. Ong 2006) 
in the sense that hard-earned rights and protections afforded disabled citizens of a country often 
do not apply to immigration applicants. In Canada, for example, immigration applicants currently 
fall outside the protections afforded citizens under the equality rights provision of the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms (hereafter ‘the Charter’). Individuals within this space may 
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therefore confront oppressive practices that have profound implications for the im/mobility of 
specific bodies. Additionally, a focus on disabled migrants deepens an understanding of the 
diversity of immigration experiences. As Cresswell and Merriman (2011, p.10) suggest, popular 
representations of migrants frequently ‘overlook not only the complex histories and geographies 
of migration but also the diverse array of individuals who have assumed this subject position.’ 
 
(Im)mobilities 
The past decade has seen a rapid growth of what some have characterized as a ‘new mobilities 
paradigm’ within geography and allied fields (Cresswell 2010b, 2014; Cresswell and Merriman 
2011; Merriman 2012; Söderström et al 2013). Like recent geographic work on disability, this 
scholarship has been influenced and undergirded in significant ways by relational approaches to 
space and subjectivity. For proponents, mobility and mobile approaches to geography offer a 
welcome alternative to sedentarist perspectives rooted in conceptions of space-time. Merriman 
(2012, p.24) argues that an embracing of movement-space involves an ontological and 
epistemological shift, centring affect, force, rhythm and movement in efforts to comprehend ‘how 
we think and feel our worlds’.  
At the same time, scholarship has shown a concurrent interest in forms and experiences of 
stillness and immobility, recognizing that the capacity to move is differentially distributed across 
populations on the basis of race, class, gender, citizenship, age and other factors. Jocoy and Del 
Casino (2010), for example, demonstrate the complex relationship between power, place and 
mobility in the everyday movements of homeless people, suggesting that, for different groups of 
people ‘mobility and immobility are each generative of both power and powerlessness.’ The same 
theme is evident at a different scale in Martin’s (2011) work on undocumented migrants, when he 
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argues that vulnerable groups locked out of global flows confront periods of ceaseless movement 
and chronic stillness, with little control over either experience. Recognizing the broad array of 
constraints that act to fix certain people in place, Cresswell (2012) has called for greater attention 
to the nature of these im/mobilities at both experiential and political levels. This necessitates close 
attention to what he has called a differential politics of mobility.  
Spinney et al (2015, 328) suggest that ‘we remain in the early stages of exploring how the 
bounding of legitimate citizenship through the ways in which people move intersects with other 
powerful delineations of social difference and competence, such as gender, ethnicity, age, 
sexuality and disability’. Importantly, these authors suggest that thinking critically about the 
relationship between im/mobility and citizenship may provide opportunities to understand 
citizenship ‘as it unfolds on the ground, shaped by embodied experiences of mobility alongside 
policy paradigms [reference omitted], and as practiced in relation to legal codifications of citizen 
mobility.’ As we suggest below, this line of thinking resonates with recent efforts to rethink the 
limits of legal protections afforded to disabled immigrants that imagine a more mobile and 
inclusive notion of citizenship.  
Exploring the confluence of disability and immigration, we draw particularly from the 
work of Söderström et al. (2013). These authors examine the implications of recent mobilities 
scholarship for the field of migration studies, arguing that the latter remains a state-centered field 
of study in which: 
The binary categorization of migrants into ‘wanted’ and ‘unwanted’ migrants from the 
perspective of the receiving state and its national economy continues to be the main axis 
of distinction as well as the fulcrum of public debate (p.xiv) 
Söderström et al. argue that a mobilities perspective provides a way to question the conceptual and 
 9 
methodological privileging of the nation-state. Such an approach does not ignore the power of the 
state but rather directs attention to the mechanisms, logics and sites through which the state’s 
power of classification is enacted and reproduced. There are parallels here with recent work on 
‘bordering’ as a way of capturing the diverse processes and places through which acceptable forms 
of mobility are distinguished from other more threatening or unwanted movements (Rumford 
2010; Cresswell 2012). 
In this paper, we examine how the state’s power to define and categorize wanted and 
unwanted migrants is enacted specifically through the medical inadmissibility provisions of 
Canadian immigration law. While in recent years immigration has been increasingly understood 
in relation to heightened (state) securitization (Amoore 2006), the focus on medical inadmissibility 
sheds light on concerns about social security and the perceived impacts of disabled bodies on 
national welfare systems. At the same time, we suggest that the contemporary situation reflects an 
intensification of market logics within the immigration system, placing greater emphasis on the 
immediate economic value of migrant bodies.  
 
Methodology 
Our methodology for this paper encompassed three distinct components. First, we collected and 
analyzed a broad range of documents, principally from Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC). 
These documents encompass the relevant acts, as well as policy directives and procedural 
documents that offer insight into the interpretation and application of the medical inadmissibility 
provisions within the immigration law. These include CIC operational directives, as well as 
documentation and instructions issued to Panel Physicians (PP) who conduct immigration medical 
examinations. These materials were accessed principally through CIC’s website. We also gathered 
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and analyzed legal documents relating to cases heard at the Federal and Supreme Courts of Canada 
that have sought to challenge the medical inadmissibility provisions. The analysis of case law, 
while not exhaustive, was guided by insight from key informants with respect to the most 
significant legal decisions. Legal documents were accessed through the online records of the 
Federal and Supreme Courts. 
Second, we interviewed six key informants who have specific knowledge of the medical 
inadmissibility provisions of immigration law. Four of these key informants are immigration 
lawyers who had been involved in legal cases concerning medical inadmissibility. The remaining 
two are immigration consultants with detailed knowledge of the immigration application process, 
including the medical inadmissibility provisions. Interviews were conducted in-person or over the 
telephone, and ranged in length from one to two hours. Interviews were transcribed in full for 
analysis. 
Finally, we obtained data from Citizenship and Immigration Canada on the numbers of 
immigration applicants deemed medically inadmissible. Obtaining these data required us to file 
Access to Information Requests. While we requested data covering the period 2000-2014, we were 
informed by CIC that ‘refusal grounds’ for unsuccessful permanent residency applications were 
confined to case notes until 2011 and were therefore not available to query. With the introduction 
of a new Global Case Management System (GCMS) in 2011/12, refusal grounds ‘have been 
captured in more of a systematic method’ (personal communication from ministry staff).  We also 
requested data on immigrants’ region of origin and specific health conditions/disabilities but were 
informed that these data were not available. 
One of the limitations of this methodology is that we have not included the voices of 
disabled persons and family members with experience of the immigration process. The main 
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reason for this absence was the difficulty of identifying and recruiting potential respondents, 
particularly those persons who has been found medically inadmissible (the majority of whom do 
not appeal this decision). We did ask some key informants about the possibility of passing on 
information about the study to past clients, but they declined to assist in the recruitment process, 
citing privacy and confidentiality as concerns.   
In what follows, we draw on these data to examine the evolving nature of the medical 
inadmissibility provisions. We then focus on the ways in which the system works in practice, 
drawing from both the key informant interviews and insights from a key legal challenge to the 
medical inadmissibility provisions. 
 
Immigration and Medical Inadmissibility 
Since confederation, Canada’s immigration laws have contained provisions to deny admission to 
immigrants because of ill health and/or disability. These have consistently identified two bases for 
exclusion. The first focuses on threats to public health and safety, both through the potential spread 
of an infectious disease and through the potential safety risk that specific individuals might pose 
(often in reference to insanity/mental ill health). The second basis for exclusion, and the focus of 
this paper, is the prospect that an immigrant with a disability or health condition might constitute 
an undue burden on the public purse. The wording from the 1906 immigration act specified that: 
No immigrant shall be permitted to land in Canada, who is feeble-minded, an idiot, or an 
epileptic, or who is insane, or has had an attack of insanity within five years; nor shall any 
immigrant be so landed who is deaf and dumb, or dumb, blind or infirm, unless he belongs 
to a family who accompany him or are already in Canada and who give security, 
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satisfactory to the Minister, for his permanent support if admitted into Canada. (An Act 
respecting Immigration and Immigrants, 1906 Section 26, p.114) 
As this excerpt makes clear, exceptions could be made if accompanying families were able to 
support disabled individuals. In such cases, families were responsible for providing a bond of 
several hundred dollars to compensate the government in the event that the individual became a 
‘public charge’. Successive revisions to the immigration act in 1910, 1919 and 1952 did little to 
change the provisions relating to disability and ill health (Mosoff 1999). In 1976, a new 
immigration act introduced the specific wording of ‘excessive demand’ in relation to Canada’s 
health and social service systems. Section 19(1)(a)(ii) of the act included the statement that: 
‘persons who are suffering from any disease, disorder, disability or other health impairment’ will 
be denied entry if, in the opinion of a medical officer, the nature, severity of probably duration of 
the condition ‘would cause or might reasonably be expected to cause excessive demands on health 
or social services.’  
During the 1990s, legal pressure against the medical inadmissibility provisions of the 
immigration act began to mount. Key here was the Angela Chesters case, in which a German-born 
woman living with Multiple Sclerosis who had applied to immigrate to Canada in 1994 to join her 
Canadian husband was denied entry on the basis that her need for ‘future health and medical 
services would fall in the category of excessive demands’ (Chesters v. Minister of Citizenship and 
Immigration 2003). Chesters appealed this decision in Federal Court, arguing that Section 
19(1)(a)(ii) of the Immigration Act contravened sections of the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms including Section 15, which guarantees equality rights for persons with disabilities. The 
Federal Court dismissed the appeal, with the judge citing as precedent earlier Supreme Court 
decisions that (1) identified immigration as a privilege rather than a right and (2) found that the 
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Charter can distinguish between citizens and non-citizens, a point to which we return below (see 
Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) v. Chiarelli, 1992).  
While Chesters’ appeal to the Charter was unsuccessful, the growing legal pressure against 
the excessive demand provisions meant, in the words of one key informant, that ‘the writing was 
on the wall that eventually this is going to get to the Supreme Court, and they are going to be found 
to be violating the Charter’ (KI6, Lawyer, Toronto). In response, the government revised the 
statutory provisions as part of broader changes contained within the 2001 Immigration and Refugee 
Protection Act (IRPA). Under IRPA, refugee claimants and some family-class applicants (spouses 
and children under 18 of persons already resident in Canada) would be exempt from medical 
inadmissibility, while other family-class applicants and applicants in the economic class (currently 
two thirds of all immigrants) would continue to be subject to the provisions (CIC facts & figures, 
2014). IRPA regulations define ‘excessive demand’ as: 
(1) a demand on health services or social services for which the anticipated costs would 
likely exceed average Canadian per capita health services and social services costs over 
a period of five consecutive years … [or] 
(2) or a demand on health services or social services that would add to existing waiting 
lists [producing] an inability to provide timely services to Canadian citizens or 
permanent residents. (Minister of Justice, 2002, p.1) 
The average per capita costs cited here are derived from annual reports from the Canadian Institute 
for Health Information; the 2014 cost threshold was set at $6,387 per year, or roughly $32,000 
over a five-year period. The majority of this amount is for health care (roughly $6,000), while the 
remaining amount reflects average per capita spending for social services, including home care, 
specialized residential services, special education services, social and vocational rehabilitation 
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services, personal support services, and assistive devices. Key informants noted that it is easy to 
exceed the cost threshold, particularly since there is no stratification of costs by age or other factors 
(i.e., the costs associated with health and social service use of older or disabled applicants are not 
compared with the average costs of older or disabled Canadians).  
Under IRPA, applicants must undergo a medical examination by a designated Panel 
Physician (PP), either within or outside of Canada. CIC provides detailed instructions to the 
medical examiners, particularly with respect to ‘conditions of significance’ relating to excessive 
demand identified in a 2003 ministry directive (these include cancers and cardiac conditions, as 
well as cognitive impairment, childhood developmental delay, hearing impairment and psychiatric 
conditions). These instructions combine a focus on timely identification of conditions with explicit 
emphasis on the potential costs of health or social service needs.  For example, the Immigration 
Medical Examination Instructions (IMEI) for hearing impairment states:    
PPs must screen all clients for deafness or hearing impairment and provide additional 
details of any abnormalities that are identified. This screening is particularly important for 
children as they would likely be offered medical/surgical interventions as well as receive 
special education and/or other social services (CIC, nd, p.1)  
If a medical examiner detects a disability or illness that they believe will involve excessive demand, 
this finding is communicated to a visa officer who in turn informs the applicant that they, or their 
dependent, may be inadmissible on health grounds. The applicant has 60 days to either challenge 
the medical finding and/or demonstrate that they have a ‘reasonable and workable plan to mitigate 
the excessive burden’. Given the public nature of the Canadian health care system, applicants 
cannot offer to privately fund the costs of anticipated inpatient care, but they can demonstrate a 
capacity to pay privately for outpatient services, prescription medication and social services. They 
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can also demonstrate the existence of other non-financial sources of support (for example, 
extended family in Canada) that might offset the use of formal services, although it is unclear to 
what extent these supports matter in the determination of eligibility.  
It is difficult to know the number of people impacted by these provisions. Data on medical 
inadmissibility are not published and numbers released through the Access to Information request 
provide only a partial representation given the absence of cases from before 2011/12. These partial 
data show there were 122 medical inadmissibility refusals finalized by the ministry in 2013 and 
145 finalized in the first six months of 2014. Due to inconsistent reporting, not all of these 
finalizations were linked to a specific health ground in the database (i.e., excessive demand, public 
health risk), but of those that were identified (n=61) all were linked to excessive burden. There are 
also limitations to relying on finalization rates. As a key informant noted when discussing the CIC 
data: 
This is not actual cases. It is extremely difficult to obtain tangible statistics from CIC in 
this area because the actual finalizations are not relevant. There might be 500 cases pending. 
They are not releasing those (KI2, Immigration lawyer, Toronto) 
However, beyond the numbers it is the meaning attributed to the potential mobility of people with 
disabilities that is at issue. The Council of Canadians with Disabilities (CCD), a national advocacy 
organization, has argued that the existence of the excessive demand provision ‘devalues Canadians 
with disabilities and does nothing to recognize the contribution persons with disabilities and their 
families can and do make to Canadian society’ (CCD 2013, no page). 
In one sense, the Canadian state’s concern with the immigration of disabled people has 
remained fairly consistent over the course of the past century (Hanes 2009). As Saltes (2013, p.64) 
argues, ‘despite numerous revisions, Canadian immigration policy continues to assess immigration 
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applicants against corporeal norms and potential expenses thereby perpetuating the idea that 
inclusion of ‘abnormal’ bodies is detrimental to a healthy and productive citizenry’. Yet there is a 
risk of over-emphasizing the permanence of the medical inadmissibility provisions in such 
statements. In some respects, things have changed. For example, the categories of immigrants 
subject to medical inadmissibility have changed. Between 1906 and 1910, revisions to the 
Immigration Act distinguished ‘physically defective’ persons from those who were deemed 
‘mentally defective’, indicating that some of the former might be eligible for immigration if they 
“have such profession, occupation, trade, employment or other legitimate mode of earning a living” 
(An Act Respecting Immigration 1910, Section 3(c), p.208).  This statutory recognition that at 
least some immigrants with physical impairments might be economically productive is deserving 
of further academic inquiry. Similarly, the more recent exemption of refugee and family class 
applicants from medical inadmissibility provisions, and the political and legal struggles that 
underlie this exemption, needs a more detailed accounting. More generally, if we return to the 
point made by Söderström et al (2013), it is important to not lose sight of the ongoing material and 
discursive work – the practices, logics and sites – in and through which the state’s power of 
classification is enacted, reproduced and contested, a topic to which we now turn. 
 
Enacting and Contesting ‘Excessive Demand’ 
In this section, we use the impacts of a landmark legal case to provide a window onto the practical 
working of the excessive burden provisions. The case involved a challenge to findings of medical 
inadmissibility brought by two applicants in the business sub-class of the broader economic class 
that was heard by the Supreme Court of Canada in 2005 (Hilewitz v. Canada (Minister of 
Citizenship and Immigration) 2005). Both applicants were deemed qualified to immigrate, but 
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were denied admissions because both had children with intellectual disabilities who were found 
inadmissible due to excessive demand.  
The Hilewitz case centered on the applicants’ argument that CIC used ‘categorical 
exclusions’ to deny entry to people with significant heath concerns and disabilities, rather than 
individualized assessments that took into account (1) the specific nature of the person’s illness or 
disability, (2) the ‘reasonable possibility’ of excessive demand rather than simply the applicant’s 
ineligibility for service; and (3) non-medical factors such as family support and the financial 
resources available to offset and/or pay for needed services. CIC countered that only medical facts 
were to be considered in determining excessive demand, and that a ‘risk averse’ approach 
recognized that a family’s resources could decline, resulting in a burden on public services. The 
Supreme Court ruled 7-2 in favour of the applicants, with the author of the majority decision noting 
that: 
It seems to me somewhat incongruous to interpret the legislation in such a way that the 
very assets that qualify investor and self-employed individuals for admission to Canada 
can simultaneously be ignored in determining the admissibility of their disabled children 
(Hilewitz v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2005, no page). 
The Supreme Court decision on individualized assessment has changed the process through which 
visa officers make decisions about disabled applicants and the practices used by applicants and 
their advocates to contest these decisions. In the application process, visa officers now 
communicate a preliminary finding of medical inadmissibility to an applicant, who is then 
provided with an opportunity contest the medical interpretation and/or the potential burden, or to 
provide a ‘mitigation plan’ to deal with the service costs. In this context, a key objective for 
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applicants is to construct the disabled person in a way that challenges their one-dimensional 
representation as an unwanted burden.  For example:  
You get an assessment that says ‘this person has borderline intellectual deficits, he is going 
to need social and vocational rehab, potentially personal support services, and on and on’. 
What is incumbent upon an applicant there is to bring forward what type of services and 
training the individual already had in their home country. That can go a long way to 
offsetting the social services cost in Canada, and most, if not all, social services can be 
privately funded (KI2, Immigration lawyer, Toronto)  
 
I gave you the example of a child on the autism spectrum. If the child is already in school 
(.) it may be possible to go to the school and ask how the child is doing and if in the school’s 
opinion the child is doing okay, have an evaluation done and put forward a medical finding 
that in fact the child does not need specialized services from the school (KI3, Immigration 
Consultant, Vancouver) 
In one sense, the space made for individualized assessment and contestation through Hilewitz is 
important in that it moves from a narrow and often generic focus on problems and costs at the time 
of application to a more contextual and longitudinal reading of the familial, social, and economic 
circumstances of individual applicants. Yet there remain significant limitations to what can be 
accomplished in this legal space. Notwithstanding the intent of the decision, key informants argued 
that visa officers continue to fall back on generic assessments of both the significance of a 
disability, and the associated service burden:  
They tend to exaggerate the prognosis and they tend to exaggerate the health care costs 
associated with that prognosis. I’m not attributing any kind of malice to CIC but I think 
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they just do a textbook looking up of the disease and their concerns are with potential 
excessive demands on health or social services so they tend to gravitate towards the worst-
case scenario (KI1 Immigration lawyer, Toronto) 
In many respects, this is not surprising and accords with the underlying bio-political logic of the 
system, in which the value and potential utility of bodies ‘is carefully calculated and managed’ by 
the state (Weibe 2009, p.129; also Ong 1995).  
More fundamentally, while individualized assessment allows for a more fine-grained 
analysis of the medical and non-medical circumstances of an applicant’s life, it leaves untouched 
the assumption that there is a threshold beyond which disabled bodies can be legitimately labeled 
excessively demanding, and therefore rendered ineligible to move. At the same time, the emphasis 
on individualized assessment, and the importance of the mitigation plan, crystallizes a broader 
differential politics, in which the mobility of some disabled bodies is made possible by the 
economic capital of individual applicants and their families (Cresswell 2010a). This fact was not 
lost on some key informants. One lawyer who worked for a disability organization noted: 
[Hilewitz] just called out for a different analysis from the one that was being put forward 
by the appellant which was if you can pay you can stay, and that shouldn’t be the grounds 
on which Canada would make their immigration policies (KI5, Immigration Lawyer, 
Toronto). 
Lawyers representing two disability organizations appeared as interveners in the Hilewitz case.  
They called for a broader framing of the issue, arguing that any interpretation of the medical 
inadmissibility and excessive demand provisions should reflect the principles of equality and non-
discrimination contained in the Section 15 of the Charter. The Supreme Court dismissed the 
arguments of the interveners in its decision on Hilewitz. However, there are ongoing efforts to re-
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imagine the relationship between the non-discrimination and equality rights of the Charter and 
immigrant applicants. On the one hand, there are efforts to challenge earlier Supreme Court rulings 
that the protections afforded by the Charter do not extend to non-citizens. While lawyers contesting 
findings of excessive demand have repeatedly argued that these provisions contravene the Charter, 
to date CIC has either won or settled these cases so that no legal precedent is set. As one key 
informant noted:  
The problem is always that you really have to get the right case that goes forward and 
usually the government is wise enough to (pause) If they think they are going to lose and 
it’s going to set a bad precedent they wait for the case to come along that they are more 
likely to win (KI6, Immigration Lawyer, Toronto) 
On the other hand, efforts to extend protections afforded by the Charter may hinge on a challenge 
to the territorial limits of Canadian law. Section 32(1) of the Charter ‘does not expressly impose 
territorial limits on [the Charter’s] reach’ (Rennie and Rothschild 2009, p.127). As a result, the 
geographical scope of the Charter’s application has been a matter for the courts to decide. While 
the Supreme Court has to date upheld the legal argument that the Charter generally does not apply 
beyond Canada, recent cases have continued to challenge these territorial limits. In particular, 
cases have directed attention at the overseas actions of Canadian government officials and 
members of the armed forces towards non-Canadian citizens, with the argument that individuals 
who are subject to Canadian laws and procedures should also be able to claim Canadian 
constitutional rights regardless of citizenship (see Rennie and Rothschild 2009; also R. v. Hape, 
2007; Amnesty International Canada v. Canada (Canadian Forces), 2008). While such cases do 
not concern medical inadmissibility specifically, their efforts to set a precedent regarding the 
application of the Charter beyond the territorial boundaries of Canada, if successful, may offer a 
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legal means to challenge the state’s use of excessive demand as a basis for excluding disabled 
immigrants. 
 
Discussion & Conclusion 
They are becoming more and more selective, focusing more and more on the economic 
benefit that the individual applicant can bring to Canada. Immigration has always brought 
economic benefit but what this government is looking for is immediate and direct. They 
need to see it. You come here. You do this job. You contribute so much. (KI4, Immigration 
Consultant, Vancouver) 
In this paper we have drawn on disability scholarship and mobilities research to examine the 
impact of medical inadmissibility provisions within Canadian immigration law. We have 
suggested that a longstanding concern with access and accessibility among disability scholars 
intersects in productive ways with questions of im/mobility and citizenship that have been central 
to recent mobilities scholarship. Together, these literatures have helped us to think through the 
ways in which medical inadmissibility provisions classify specific disabled bodies as excessively 
demanding, thereby rendering them ineligible to move as immigrants to Canada.  
It is important to acknowledge the limitations of the work presented here.  First, our data 
are limited in the sense that we do not include the perspectives of persons with disabilities and 
their families whose im/mobility has been impacted by these statutory provisions.  The limited 
data obtained from CIC also make it difficult to assess the numbers of people directly impacted by 
these provisions. We have also not been able to systematically examine the ways in which 
disability intersects with other social differences like race, class and nationality to shape 
experiences within the immigration system. The legal cases we examined, as well as recent media 
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coverage of the medical inadmissibility issue, have involved disabled persons (both adults and 
children) and families from developed countries who are typically well educated and possess the 
economic resources necessary to challenge CIC’s finding of medical inadmissibility. In this sense, 
they are not representative of a larger population of disabled persons, in both the global north and 
south, for whom the prospect of international migration is unlikely.   
Notwithstanding these limitations, our analysis highlights the ways in which 
understandings and experiences of disability emerge in relation to the statutory provisions 
governing medical inadmissibility within Canada’s immigration system. These statutory 
provisions, and the procedures and assessments that they necessitate, rest on narrowly defined 
biomedical criteria, which perpetuate a ‘deficit’ model of disability. The process of assessment 
and categorization is relational in the sense that medical examinations work to define and govern 
the movement of both the ‘good immigrant’ and the unwanted applicant. At the same time, these 
provisions send important signals about the ‘bounding of legitimate citizenship’ in relation to 
issues of mobility (Spinney et al 2015: 328; also Weibe 2009; Cresswell 2013); indeed the actions 
of the state with respect to disabled applicants convey an enduring assumption that disabled bodies 
are inherently burdensome, a status masked but not erased by hard-won legal protections available 
to Canadian citizens.  
In one sense, there are significant continuities between the contemporary system and 
provisions that existed in immigration law dating back to the mid-19th Century. Yet we have also 
heeded arguments in recent mobility scholarship that it is important not to take for granted the 
state’s power to categorize and control migrant bodies. As Söderstrom et al (2013) argue, the 
‘immigration system’ is enacted, reproduced and contested over time and in the context of specific 
sites. Some sense of this ongoing work of enacting and contesting emerges from our analysis of 
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the policy documents, procedure manuals and key informant interviews. Following the Supreme 
Court decision in Hilewitz, CIC visa officers have been required to provide individualized 
assessments to determine excessive demand, while immigration applicants, family members and 
advocates can now work to provide more ‘contextual’ representations of disabled people’s lives. 
The range of practices open to actors within the immigration system has thus changed in small but 
significant ways.  
These revisions are positive in some respects; they allow applicants to broaden the meaning 
of disability from a narrow medical reading of embodied ‘deficits’ and they permit some 
recognition of diversity among disabled people. In this sense, the changes create potential for other 
ways of understanding and enacting disability in the relations between applicants, families, visa 
officers, medical examiners and others that animate the immigration system. Yet the revisions 
leave unchallenged the legitimacy of excessive demand as a basis for exclusion. Moreover, the 
shift to individualized assessments – coupled with the ability for applicants to pay to offset the 
‘burden’ of disability – can be seen as entirely consistent with a particular neoliberal intensification 
of market logics in the contemporary immigration system (Ong 2006). In this context, governing 
strategies “promote an economic logic in defining, evaluating and protecting certain categories of 
subject and not others” (Ong 2006, p.16). With respect to medical inadmissibility, this entails the 
application of calculative practices by the state to evaluate the capacities and costs of individual 
applicants and their families. The results of such calculative action render some disabled applicants 
admissible to Canada (although they may be denied access to social benefits and entitlements) 
while others are excluded. Significantly, the balance between political and market logics is shaped 
and constrained in the Canadian context by the public nature of the health care system, and the 
limited potential to purchase private medical services. It is around the edges of the Canadian health 
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care system (e.g., in private payment for prescription drugs) and in the private funding of social 
services where the economic resources of individual applicants and families can be used to render 
otherwise problematic bodies mobile.  
Finally, we note that recent developments concerning medical inadmissibility resonate 
with broader trends in Canadian immigration policy. As the quote at the beginning of the 
conclusion suggests, recent years have witnessed an increased emphasis on exploiting the 
immediate economic benefits of migrants (also De Genova 2013) while limiting the state’s 
exposure to their social reproductive costs.  For example, there has been a rapid increase in the 
number of temporary foreign workers (tripling between 2002 and 2012 to over 300,000), who are 
expected to come with few of the social costs associated with permanent settlement. In addition, 
CIC introduced a ‘super-visa’ for parents and grandparents in the family class in 2014 to replace 
permanent residency. While visas permit stays of up to two years, they prohibit access to public 
health services and require purchase of private health insurance. In the same year, CIC reduced the 
maximum age for dependent children, so that youth between 19 and 22 can no longer accompany 
parents, but must now apply to come to Canada “on their own merits, as foreign students or through 
various economic programs” (Government of Canada 2014, no page). Like current medical 
inadmissibility provisions, these developments signal both a growing state concern with old, young, 
and disabled migrants as potential threats to social security, and a concurrent market-driven logic 
that assesses the capacity of individual migrants to offset public costs through human and 
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